United Nations S/2009/210

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2009

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009). In that resolution, the Council expressed its intent to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), subject to a further decision of the Council by 1 June 2009, and requested me to submit a report by 15 April 2009, providing my assessment in advance of that decision. The present report provides an update on the implementation of the resolution, including developments in the political process, an assessment of the security situation on the ground, and progress towards the full deployment and strengthening of AMISOM, covering the period since my report of 9 March 2009 (S/2009/132). On the basis of the outcome of the ongoing integrated mission planning process, the report also sets out the strategic objectives of the United Nations for Somalia and provides recommendations on the mandate of the envisaged United Nations peacekeeping operation, as requested in paragraph 6 of resolution 1863 (2009). In addition, the report brings to the attention of the Security Council all the scenarios and options identified during the integrated mission planning process, and provides my recommendations on the way forward.

II. Main developments in Somalia

A. Political developments

2. Since the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as President, the unity government has taken tangible steps to reach out, directly and by proxy, to those opposition groups outside of the Djibouti peace process. Somalia's elders, scholars and clerics have also engaged with those opposition groups to convince them to join the unity government. On 20 February 2009, the Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, formed an enlarged unity Cabinet consisting of 36 members from the previous Transitional Federal Government, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, civil society and Somalis from the diaspora. The newly formed Cabinet relocated to Mogadishu on 26 February and convened its first meeting on 1 March, and the enlarged Parliament held its inaugural session on 13 March, the first to be held in the capital since the formation of the transitional federal institutions in 2002. From 26 February to 1 April 2009, the Cabinet held six meetings addressing issues

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pertaining to security, revenue collection mechanisms, reconciliation and the drafting of the constitution. In an attempt to reach out to hardliners, on 10 March the Cabinet voted in favour of implementing sharia law in Somalia. The law will be submitted to the Parliament for consideration.

3. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed undertook official visits to a number of African countries in the region in March and also participated in the twelfth African Union Summit immediately after his inauguration. The President also visited the troop-contributing countries of Burundi and Uganda, and appealed to them to continue contributing their troops within the existing mandate of AMISOM, until Somali forces are able to assume responsibility for security in Mogadishu. On 29 March 2009, the President travelled to Qatar to attend a summit of the League of Arab States which was held on 30 March. On the sidelines of the summit in Doha, I met President Shéikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who reaffirmed his commitment to working with all parties and to restoring the credibility of his country.

4. On 9 March, representatives of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM and the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat carried out a one-day visit to Mogadishu. A further mission to Mogadishu was undertaken by UNPOS and the United Nations resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator on 26 and 27 March, to meet with representatives of the Government and AMISOM. During that visit, the delegation was received by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and held extensive talks with Prime Minister Sharmarke on the Government's immediate objectives and the role which the United Nations could play to assist. On 20 March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar, had asked the international community to support his Government on issues pertaining to security stabilization, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and piracy. As requested in Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), I intend to consult all stakeholders on the convening of an international peace conference to include local, regional and international actors. The international peace conference would address issues relating to capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and sustainable development.

B. Security situation

5. The security situation in Somalia remains extremely volatile and unpredictable. Following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces and the formation of the new Government, the realignment of armed factions and groups continues. In some areas, popular support for the insurgency seems to be waning; insurgent attacks continue, however, and reports of a new influx of foreign fighters allied to radical groups are of serious concern. While the incidence of hostile acts by radical groups and other factions has not markedly changed since my last report, insurgent attacks, including against AMISOM, are becoming more sophisticated, coordinated and lethal.

6. In Mogadishu, inter-clan fighting reportedly subsided in the wake of reconciliation efforts between the Government and local leaders. However, following a number of public threats, several significant attacks were carried out against AMISOM. The most lethal of these was the double suicide bombing of the Burundian base on 22 February 2009, in which 11 peacekeepers were killed and 28 other soldiers injured. That attack combined several advanced terrorist tactics,

which indicates the growing capacity of certain insurgent groups to deploy asymmetrical warfare. Roadside bombs and improvised explosive device attacks also continued against AMISOM and Government officials. On 26 March in Mogadishu, a roadside bomb explosion struck the vehicle of the new Government's Interior Minister, killing one bodyguard and two civilians. The Minister suffered minor injuries. On 16 March, in Wajid, 280 km north-west of Mogadishu, four United Nations staff members were abducted but later released unharmed.

7. During a ministerial meeting of AMISOM troop-contributing countries on 23 March, the AMISOM Force Commander cautioned against deception from the "false calm" in Mogadishu. He noted the reports of an influx of foreign fighters into Somalia in support of Al-Shabaab, and stressed that in his view the current calm reflected only a tactical withdrawal by insurgents ahead of a new wave of attacks. He highlighted threats to AMISOM forces including improvised explosive devices, mines, roadside bombs, mortar shells, suicide bombs and sniper fire. He also drew attention to a memorandum presented by traditional leaders to the Prime Minister, in which they recommended that no additional AMISOM troops should be deployed, no United Nations troops should enter Somalia and AMISOM should depart within 120 days.

8. Al-Shabaab and allied insurgent factions continue to control large parts of south and central Somalia, although the popularity of the Al-Shabaab movement appears weakened, since two pillars of its political platform have been removed by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the decision of the new Government to institute sharia law. Popular resistance to the insurgency is reported more frequently. In Baidoa on 26 March, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets in protest against a ban on the sale of the narcotic khat. In the Ceel Buur region of central Somalia, an emerging alliance known as Al-Sunna w'al-Jama'a reportedly succeeded in driving Al-Shabaab insurgents out of several towns, though the situation remains fragile and regrouping of various insurgent militias is ongoing. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab forces defeated Government forces in the northern town of Xuddur. On 20 March, the leader of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (Asmara), Sheikh Hassan Aweys, rejected the call, made in a recorded statement by Osama bin Laden, for Somalis to topple the new Government.

9. Mogadishu and the district of Badhadhe at the southern tip of the country remain in United Nations security phase V while the remainder of Somalia is in phase IV. After a review of security arrangements in the aftermath of the bombing of the office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Hargeysa in October 2008, United Nations activities inside Somalia have been scaled up again during the reporting period: international staff numbers increased from 50 to 85, while the number of national staff has reached approximately 800. Several critical programmes in Mogadishu are maintained by a small number of national staff, but there is currently no United Nations presence of international staff in the capital. International staff have begun to return to Jawhar and conduct missions to Beledweyne. In view of the continuation of direct threats against United Nations staff, a further significant expansion of activities will necessitate implementation of more robust security arrangements, as well as improved contingency support.

10. Missions by United Nations international staff to Mogadishu, which had been suspended in June 2008, have also resumed though their frequency and duration, as well as permissible ground movement, remain very limited in view of pronounced

direct and collateral threats. During March three separate visits were undertaken by small numbers of United Nations international personnel, and UNPOS and a delegation of the United Nations country team visited Mogadishu on 1 April for consultations with the Somali Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

C. Humanitarian situation

11. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia is deepening, owing to the combined effects of drought, conflict, inflation and continued lack of humanitarian access. Some 3.25 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. One in six Somali children under 5 is acutely malnourished. With an estimated median prevalence of 18.5 per cent global acute malnutrition and 2.5 per cent severe acute malnutrition, acute malnutrition remains consistently and significantly beyond the emergency threshold (15 per cent) according to reports of the Food Security Assessment Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. In total, 330,000 children in Somalia are acutely malnourished, of whom 96,000 are severely malnourished (at nine times greater risk of death than non-malnourished children) and in need of immediate assistance. In urban areas, food insecurity was exacerbated by a drop in remittances from the Somali diaspora, related to the global economic crisis. As a result of crossfire between Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM troops and Al-Shabaab forces and Hizbul Islam (a new armed group that has emerged in Mogadishu), 33 verified reports of child deaths were recorded in January and February by partner monitors of UNICEF, which is a cause for concern.

12. Since 15 January, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 55,000 people have returned to Mogadishu, mainly from areas experiencing renewed conflict and severe drought. Continuing insecurity and lack of basic services suggest that organized returns are not appropriate at this time. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organization partners are however preparing contingency plans to help those who return. Overall, approximately 1.3 million Somalis remain internally displaced.

13. Relief activities for 2009 are seriously underfunded. The 2009 Somalia consolidated appeal process has received only 26 per cent of the US$ 918 million requested; the bulk of the funds (79 per cent) are allocated to food while critical sectors such as water/sanitation and health received only 2 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. Although Somalia is among the most dangerous environments in the world for humanitarian workers, no funding has been committed to the consolidated appeal segment for safety and security. The Central Emergency Response Fund has allocated $10 million to support priority life-saving programmes. A significant amount of additional resources is however urgently required to ensure delivery of life-saving assistance and preserve livelihoods.

D. Human rights

14. The human rights situation in Somalia remains precarious and, particularly with regard to security, human rights defenders continue to face very serious constraints in documenting abuses. There have been fewer reports of large-scale indiscriminate attacks on civilians during this reporting period, but civilians continue to risk death and injury as a result of fighting between different groups and

the use of improvised explosive devices. Although the motives and perpetrators are not clear in some cases, targeted and attempted assassinations have allegedly continued, the targets including at least three religious clerics, the director of a Mogadishu hospital and the Interior Minister. Journalists continue to endure threats, intimidation and the risk of assassination, as well as detention. Grave violations against children and women have been reported throughout the country, including the recruitment and use of children by several parties to the conflict, killing and maiming as a result of the fighting, indiscriminate or excess use of force and rape and other forms of violence against women and children.

15. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, including prolonged detention before the initial court appearance, and executions following proceedings by Islamic courts have been documented in some parts of the country. In addition, ongoing impunity for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law remains a major issue of concern.

16. Despite the delays in the commencement of the activities of the Justice and Reconciliation Working Group established in 2008, a second workshop is proposed in the near future. Representatives of the Transitional Federal Government have expressed a willingness to discuss the strengthening of human rights protection and promotion in Somalia. The harmonization of sharia law and the promotion and protection of human rights will present unique challenges.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)

A. Progress towards full deployment and strengthening of AMISOM

17. In March, AMISOM completed deployment of its fifth battalion, comprising 850 troops from Uganda. That brought the AMISOM troop strength to 4,340 troops, or 54 per cent of the mandated strength, composed of three battalions from Uganda and two battalions from Burundi. The additional battalion pledged by Burundi has yet to be deployed. On 27 March, the Permanent Mission of Burundi sent a note verbale to the United Nations Secretariat indicating that the deployment of the additional battalion will be subject to the participation of other troop-contributing countries in AMISOM; the transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation; the provision of adequate material assistance; and an increase in the rate of troop reimbursement. The African Union continues to seek offers from troop-contributing countries for additional capacities to bring the force up to its full mandated strength of 8,000 troops. The African Union reports, however, that no firm offers have been forthcoming. I urge African Union member States to come forward with the necessary troop pledges.

18. On 16 March, I met the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Burundi, who expressed concern about equipment shortfalls facing the Burundi contingent in AMISOM, especially armoured personnel carriers and body armour for troops. The Ministers appealed for assistance in providing this crucial equipment, which they stressed would enable their Government to expedite the deployment of its additional battalion to AMISOM. The President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, conveyed the same message at my meeting with him on 18 March. I therefore appeal to Member States to assist in providing Burundi with the required equipment. I also appeal to Member States to help in meeting the other critical military needs identified in my

letter of 30 January to the Security Council, including inshore patrol boats to permit patrolling of Mogadishu harbour, and training in counter-improvised explosive devices patrolling techniques.

19. AMISOM is currently deployed at the seaport and airport, Villa Somalia, the old university and military academy, and other strategic sites in Mogadishu. The forces provide security to the airport and seaport, and other sites, convoy escort of shipping into the port, basic medical support and freshwater to the local community, transport support and protection of visiting international delegates, including all United Nations teams, and support to the fledgling Somali National Security Force.

B. Delivery of the United Nations support package for AMISOM

20. On 7 April, the General Assembly approved the first phase of the United Nations logistical support package to AMISOM. This first tranche of assistance, in the amount of $71.6 million, will enable the United Nations to take over funding of existing contractual arrangements for support, to establish the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, and to deliver immediate support in specific areas prior to the roll-out of the full support package in June.

21. Following the technical assistance mission conducted in January 2009 and subsequent discussions with AMISOM leadership, the United Nations identified specific areas of immediate support, which included enhancement of AMISOM medical facilities and medical evacuation capacity, entailing safety enhancements to Mogadishu airport and positioning of one small fixed-wing jet aircraft in Nairobi; funding for the construction of the AMISOM level 2 hospital and force headquarters; enhancement of strategic and tactical communications capacity; and training for the AMISOM troops in the use and maintenance of United Nations-owned equipment. Support in these areas is intended to help AMISOM enhance its security and operational effectiveness, and prepare for deployment of incoming battalions.

22. To this end, essential equipment from the United Nations strategic deployment stocks is being pre-positioned in Brindisi for airlift to Entebbe by mid-April. This includes field defence stores; medical supplies; a mobile airfield lighting system; one airfield firefighting truck; information and communications equipment and related infrastructure. In addition, United Nations-owned equipment has been shipped to Mogadishu. It includes prefabricated accommodation and ablution units, soft-skinned vehicles and air-conditioning units, as proposed by the Secretary-General for immediate in-kind enhancement of AMISOM through the transfer of assets following the liquidation of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The donation of these assets to AMISOM was considered and recommended for approval by the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly.

23. Critical to establishing the necessary framework for United Nations cooperation with AMISOM and the African Union is the establishment of a memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the United Nations, based on appropriate internal control procedures, which will define the overall relationship and the respective roles, responsibilities and liabilities of the two organizations. This memorandum of understanding is important for the establishment of the necessary oversight and accountability mechanisms. The work to conclude the memorandum of understanding is in progress.

24. The Department of Field Support is reviewing options to advance the construction of the AMISOM headquarters and level 2 hospital, including assessing contractual arrangements. The Department is also working to seek an agreement under which the United Nations would fund the existing contracted support to AMISOM for a six-month period, extended from March 2009. In parallel, the Department is making efforts to establish service support contracts to replace existing arrangements before September 2009.

25. The core team of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM has been established. Recruitment of staff is ongoing and an initial team is already deployed in Nairobi. A United Nations Support Office for AMISOM liaison presence was also established in Addis Ababa and Entebbe. In addition, a small team from the Department of Field Support undertook an initial AMISOM assessment visit to Mogadishu.

26. The support package to AMISOM envisages a phased approach, dependent on the eventual establishment of a small presence of support and administrative personnel of the Support Office in Mogadishu. This is an essential prerequisite, security conditions permitting, to ensure the appropriate support and oversight required for AMISOM support. However, as the applicable security policies under current conditions (United Nations security phase V) do not permit the permanent assignment of international United Nations staff (see also paras. 68-72), it is planned to conduct regular missions until the necessary security infrastructure is built up to allow a semi-permanent presence with international staff to rotate in and out of Mogadishu. The support package to AMISOM will be closely coordinated among all international and national actors and stakeholders concerned, including the United Nations country team, UNPOS and the donors, to avoid duplication of functions and to increase efficiency.

C. United Nations planning support to AMISOM

27. In line with resolution 1863 (2009), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to provide assistance to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM through United Nations planning experts in Addis Ababa. In the reporting period, the experts provided advice to the African Union on all military and police planning and operational matters related to AMISOM. In particular, the United Nations planning experts helped to review and update the AMISOM military and police concepts of operations and assisted in the preparation of the force and police generation strategy to raise military, police and civilian peacekeepers for AMISOM. The team developed budgets and projected equipment needs ahead of the April 2009 donors' conference, assisted in predeployment training and preparations, and in building the capacity of the African Union in the areas of procurement, management of human resources, medical support and public information activities. As at 1 April, the United Nations planning experts in Addis Ababa comprised 12 personnel, including military, civilian police, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration expert, and logistics and other support planning experts.

D. Development of the Somali security forces and police

28. The transitional security arrangements established under the Djibouti peace process comprise three key institutions, namely, the Joint Security Committee, the Joint Security Force and the Somali Police Force. The Transitional Federal Government has renamed the Joint Security Force the National Security Force. The new Transitional Federal Government has also stated that security is among its highest priorities, and moved quickly to establish a new security committee comprising the Ministers of National Security, Defence and Internal Affairs. The establishment of the new Committee raised some questions about the role of and possible duplication with the Joint Security Committee established in the framework of the Djibouti Agreement, which has formal responsibility for the creation and development of the National Security Force and the Somali Police Force. Following meetings of the Government and Joint Security Committee members with UNPOS, together with the African Union, it was clarified that the Joint Security Committee will continue to fulfil its role as envisaged in the Djibouti Agreement, and will provide advice to the National Security Council.

29. Arrangements are being finalized to enhance the operational capability of the Joint Security Committee, which will be chaired by the Government jointly with UNPOS and AMISOM. The Joint Security Committee will oversee four working groups which will be responsible for developing plans and recommendations regarding, respectively, professionalization of military forces; development of the civilian police; development of the security sector institutional framework, including relevant ministries and oversight bodies; and planning for future needs, including a possible future disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

30. At present, the National Security Force comprises a group of ex-Transitional Federal Government forces and ex-Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia forces, estimated at some 3,300 personnel who were deployed to secure the areas vacated by the Ethiopian forces in January. These are characterized as joint forces, although they currently operate in separate geographical areas and are managed by local security committees. National Security Force personnel work alongside approximately 2,700 members of the Somali Police Force, trained by UNDP. While these arrangements have proved effective in filling the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, they have yet to be formalized in line with the Djibouti Agreement. At the same time, issues of funding, vetting, accountability, governance and sustainability of the National Security Force have yet to be resolved.

31. A critical priority for the Joint Security Committee will be to provide strategic direction to the formal establishment of the National Security Force, which requires developing a clear mandate and associated tasks, distinct from those of the civilian police, as well as provisions to ensure effective command and control, inclusive recruitment, adequate vetting and accountability mechanisms including civilian oversight. Such measures will be essential to ensure a human rights-compliant police force which enjoys the respect and support of the civilian population. In this regard, the Government has begun work to identify, verify and register existing Transitional Federal Government and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia personnel and to formalize command and control arrangements.

32. Donor assistance to this process will be essential. Pressing needs include the continuing supply of water, food, fuel and medical assistance to the ad hoc Somali security forces that are currently providing security in Mogadishu. AMISOM is currently providing these basic needs with donor assistance. Donor support is also required for the operations of the Joint Security Committee. On the basis of a plan being developed with the Joint Security Committee, bilateral donors will be approached to provide training and equipment to the National Security Force. Funding will also be required for stipends, although the Government is seeking to share part of the cost from its own revenues.

33. Meanwhile, with regard to the police, UNDP re-initiated its police training programme with the graduation of 80 trainers who were trained in collaboration with the Ugandan Police Force. The goal is to train 4,000 more police officers in the intermediate term, utilizing existing facilities in Mogadishu now undergoing rehabilitation. Training of police cadets will depend, however, on confirmed donor support for stipends. Donors are requested to confirm support for the payment of stipends, which is a high priority. The Government has indicated its wish to have all 10,000 police who have been earmarked to cover Mogadishu and south central Somalia trained as soon as possible. As mentioned in my report of 9 March, a clear division of responsibilities has been defined between UNDP, UNPOS and the African Union for supporting the development of the Somali police, complementing the ongoing UNDP-led rule of law and security programme. Bilateral partners should assist by equipping the police and building the police infrastructure.

34. As requested in resolution 1863 (2009), UNPOS will establish dedicated capacity to support the development of the Somali security sector, including advisers on military and police training, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mine action, human rights, justice and corrections in coordination with ongoing AMISOM and UNDP work in these areas.

E. Trust funds and donors' conference

35. As requested in paragraph 8 of resolution 1863 (2009), I intend to convene a donors' conference on 23 April 2009 in Brussels to solicit contributions both for AMISOM needs not covered by the United Nations logistical support package and to support the Somali transitional security institutions. The documents setting out priority requirements will shortly be presented to donors. The European Union has generously offered to host the conference, which will be held under the joint auspices of the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and the League of Arab States.

36. In addition, contributions may be made through two separate United Nations trust funds established pursuant to resolution 1863 (2009) or as bilateral assistance to AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government. The United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM will channel financial assistance from donors to the African Union and AMISOM troop-contributing countries, for troop reimbursement and procuring contingent equipment. Separately, the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali Security Forces will channel financial assistance to the Somali authorities in support of the sustainment and development of the Joint Security Committee and the National Security Force (Joint Security Force) envisaged in the Djibouti Agreement. The ongoing UNDP rule of law and security programme constitutes an additional

funding mechanism for the development of a civilian Somali police force. The United Nations planning experts in Addis Ababa have been working closely with AMISOM to prepare a prioritized list of equipment and personnel needs for presentation to the international community at the donors' conference to be held on 23 April 2009.

37. In addition to the programmes planned by UNDP, dedicated donor funds should be earmarked to further support the immediate strengthening of the justice and prison systems and the building of State and local institutions. Activities to be funded will include repairing basic infrastructure, training of prison and justice officials, salary stipends, and constitution and legislative development.

IV. Future role of the United Nations

38. In paragraph 5 of its resolution 1863 (2009), the Security Council requested me to provide my assessment in advance of its decision regarding the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation as a follow-on force to AMISOM. At the same time, in paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Council requested me to develop recommendations on the mandate of the envisaged peacekeeping operation.

39. In order to prepare a comprehensive assessment in this regard, the Secretariat activated the integrated mission planning process, to which representatives of all relevant departments, offices and agencies, as well as UNPOS and the United Nations country team, contributed. In line with the established guidance on integrated planning, the integrated mission planning process focused on (a) defining a shared vision of the United Nations strategic objectives for Somalia; (b) reaching a common understanding of the challenges and risks; and (c) identifying options for action to deliver the strategic objectives, including through the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. These important elements are set out below, together with my assessment, while the other updates requested by the Council are provided in sections II and III above.

Strategic objectives

40. The integrated mission planning process reviewed the strategic objectives of the United Nations in Somalia defined in the 2008 strategic assessment and the report of the Secretary-General of 14 March 2008 (S/2008/178 and Corr.1 and 2), the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 19 December 2008 (S/2008/804) and the findings of the technical assessment mission presented in my report of 9 March 2009 (S/2009/132), and revisited these in the light of developments in the political process and the security and humanitarian situation on the ground.

41. The overarching goal of the United Nations in Somalia remains close to that defined in the 2008 strategic assessment: to help to improve the lives of Somalis by ending violent conflict and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and a return to normalcy. This requires simultaneous and mutually reinforcing progress on three main tracks: political, security and recovery. At the same time, given the scale and urgency of humanitarian needs, humanitarian assistance must continue to be provided with full respect for the humanitarian principles of impartiality, humanity, neutrality and independence.

42. The key strategic objectives of the United Nations in Somalia on the three tracks are therefore the following:

(a) **On the political track**, to assist the Transitional Federal Government in building support for the peace process in Somalia and the region, and in fostering national reconciliation and sustaining dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and opposition groups within the framework of the Djibouti peace process; in building capacity for local governance and taking forward key transitional tasks, including the drafting of a constitution; and in supporting the integration of human rights into all aspects of the peace process;

(b) **On the security track**, to assist the Transitional Federal Government in creating security conditions in which the process of building the State institutions can take root, humanitarian aid can be provided safely and recovery efforts can progress. In this regard, the priority is to build the basis of a legitimate locally owned and developed national security apparatus, consisting of the National Security Force and the civilian police, firmly committed to the rule of law, incorporating comprehensive justice, including juvenile justice, and corrections capacity, and in accordance with principles of good governance and accountability consistent with international norms;

(c) **On the recovery track**, the strategic objective of the United Nations should be to help Somalia to move beyond the current emergency and ensure that its people experience some benefit from the peace process, in the form of access to basic services (including water, health and education), livelihood support and opportunities, rehabilitation of key infrastructure, and other rapid-impact recovery programmes. While these tracks are pursued, addressing the life-saving and protection needs of some 3.2 million people in need of emergency assistance remains a critical priority.

43. In all of these activities, success will hinge on supporting solutions that are progressively owned and led by Somalis, and not externally imposed. Accordingly, the priority on all three tracks should be to build the capacity of Somali society and institutions. Capacity-building should take account of the Government's transitional status and focus on enabling it to deliver on transition tasks, while at the same time building the basis for national institutions that can effectively stabilize and develop Somalia in the long term.

Challenges

44. Insecurity represents the single greatest obstacle to effective international engagement in Somalia, yet conventional security responses may not be appropriate given the complex and asymmetric nature of the challenges. In particular, the insertion of international security forces in Somalia remains a divisive and politicized issue with the potential to exacerbate conflict. The issue of deploying a United Nations peacekeeping operation remains contentious, with divided positions among the Somali political actors. The most delicate challenge for the United Nations is therefore to devise means of engagement that permit effective delivery while ensuring the protection of United Nations staff and minimizing the risk of fuelling divisions among Somalis or of getting drawn into the conflict.

45. A second challenge relates to the need to foster Somali ownership and build the capacity of the transitional institutions, while also respecting the need for

inclusion and enhancing legitimacy. Given the fractious nature of Somali society and the role of clans and sub-clans in politics, it is essential to ensure that all processes supported by the United Nations are as inclusive as possible, in particular the building of security institutions; without this, such assistance can readily be perceived as supporting one clan or leader over others. Equally, it is important to ensure that investment in the development of security institutions is matched by commensurate development of the rule of law, including judicial and corrections systems, and respect for human rights including the rights of the child.

46. A third challenge relates to maintaining the right balance between preserving humanitarian space and ensuring an integrated approach to United Nations efforts in support of the peace process. It is essential that humanitarian, political, security and recovery efforts are coordinated in an integrated manner, while respecting the various mandates of the relevant United Nations stakeholders and maintaining the necessary coherence in the implementation of the United Nations strategy. In all areas, operating with limited international United Nations presence on the ground creates challenges of accountability, which necessitate creative approaches and constant attention to monitor delivery of programming and possible unintended consequences.

47. A Headquarters-level inter-agency mission is planned for May 2009 to support the Somalia United Nations country team and UNPOS with regard to risk assessment, risk mitigation and risk management, given the unique and very challenging operational environment in Somalia.

Possible approaches for international engagement

48. Considering the strategic objectives as well as the challenges and risks identified above, the participants in the integrated mission planning process further developed the plans for a United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia and recommendations for its mandate, as requested in resolution 1863 (2009). Also agreed was the need to consider other possible options and scenarios for United Nations engagement in Somalia, in the event that the Security Council decides not to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the present stage. These approaches, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive and could be part of a phased effort, are set out below.

Transition from AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping operation (option A)

49. Contingency planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation that would take over from AMISOM and expand its presence progressively across Somalia has been ongoing, on the basis of the requests of the Council in its resolutions 1772 (2007) and 1814 (2008). The existing contingency plans were reviewed by the technical assessment mission in February 2009 and further refined through the integrated mission planning process.

50. The plan for the envisaged peacekeeping operation is provided in my report of 9 March 2009 (S/2009/132, paras. 53-65). The plan foresees a force of some 22,500 troops, deployed across five sectors, and supported by maritime and aviation

components. The mission would also include a substantial police component of approximately 1,500 police officers and up to 8 formed police units. Support to the Somali authorities to address the shortcomings of the prison system would be provided through the deployment of corrections officers seconded from Member States to focus on the most urgent problems, as well as an appropriate civilian component.

51. The primary role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation would be to contribute to the creation of a secure environment that would permit the safe provision of humanitarian aid, help the Djibouti peace process to make progress, allow the rebuilding of Somali State institutions to take root, and support ongoing recovery efforts. The peacekeeping operation would support the Transitional Federal Government in delivering on the tasks of the transition, including by facilitating access for those involved in the political process, by monitoring the implementation of security arrangements and by providing advice to the Joint Security Committee. A central aspect of the mission's role would be to provide technical advice on the development of security sector and rule of law institutions, including joint security forces, civilian police, judiciary, prisons, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action, as well as on the protection and promotion of human rights, including the protection, well-being and rights of children. It is envisaged that these tasks would be organized under a single dedicated pillar within the mission's civilian component, and closely coordinated with the United Nations country team.

52. With respect to the tasks set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1863 (2009), specifically the provision of humanitarian assistance, all humanitarian actors have stressed the need for particular care to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance based on need, and the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Care should be taken to avoid the politicization of aid delivery, and to prevent humanitarian efforts from being drawn into the conflict. A peacekeeping operation in Somalia should have, in this respect, a responsibility to facilitate humanitarian assistance through the promotion of a secure environment in which aid can be more freely delivered.

53. On this basis, it is recommended that the key tasks of the anticipated peacekeeping mission, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, would include:

(a) To provide good offices and political support to the Djibouti peace process;

(b) To support the Joint Security Committee in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the cessation of hostilities under the Djibouti Agreement, as well as any subsequent ceasefire arrangements and joint security arrangements; to provide technical assistance to the Joint Security Committee in the implementation of its functions, including in the investigation of ceasefire violations; and, within its capabilities, to support the monitoring of illegal weapons traffic by providing the Monitoring Group with any related information;

(c) Within its capabilities, to contribute to a secure environment in support of the peace process; to facilitate the free movement, safe passage and protection of those involved in the political process; and to provide security for key political infrastructure;

(d) To facilitate the free flow of humanitarian assistance by establishing the necessary security conditions; and to assist, within its capabilities, in the safe and dignified voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to support the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

(f) To take necessary actions, in the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence without prejudice to the responsibility of the State;

(g) In conjunction with regional and international donor partners and other interested parties, to support the Transitional Federal Government in developing and implementing plans for the effective re-establishment, training and retention of inclusive Somali security institutions, including the military and police, based on a security sector assessment and within an overall framework consistent with the National Security and Stabilization Plan, building on the ongoing UNDP programme to support the rule of law and security;

(h) In conjunction with regional and international donor partners and other interested parties, to support the strengthening of justice and corrections institutions and the training of judicial and corrections officers on the basis of a rule of law assessment and building on the ongoing United Nations country team programme to support the rule of law and security, as well as future needs related to the peace process;

(i) To support the Transitional Federal Government in developing and delivering plans for arms control and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including the release and reintegration of children recruited and used by armed factions and groups;

(j) To provide mine action, including mine risk education, survey, clearance, and the development of national mine action capabilities;

(k) Working with Somali stakeholders, to strengthen the monitoring and investigation of human rights concerns, to identify remedies and implementation measures, including capacity-building, to support the establishment of adequate mechanisms to address questions of impunity and accountability, and to support the development of appropriate institutions to promote and protect human rights;

(l) To support measures for increased protection of women and girls through ongoing consultation with women's civil society organizations, and, working with community leaders, to document, monitor and change community attitudes towards impunity and violence against women;

(m) To promote and ensure the protection of children affected by armed conflict in accordance with and in application of Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1539 (2004) on children and armed conflict;

(n) To provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention training and HIV interventions for members of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and training in HIV for the inclusive national security services/forces in collaboration with relevant partners on the ground.

54. I strongly reaffirm integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations has a country team and a

multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office. However, I have noted the humanitarian community's concerns (para. 52 above). In this regard, the envisaged peacekeeping mission would adopt a gradual approach towards structural integration. In line with the Organization's policy on integration, coherence and coordination would be ensured initially through an integrated strategic approach and a common set of strategic objectives, supported inter alia through a joint planning unit in UNPOS. In general, the structure of the mission should complement existing United Nations country team capacity and avoid replicating existing programmes or supplanting local processes. This arrangement would be revisited as the situation on the ground evolved.

55. It is expected that a United Nations peacekeeping operation would be deployed under basic conditions that would allow such a mission to operate effectively. This would include meeting the benchmarks set out in the Secretary-General's report of 9 March 2009, notably consent to the deployment by all the major Somali political actors on the ground and adequate pledges of troops and required military capacities by Member States. Timelines for deployment and the transfer of authority from AMISOM to the United Nations operation should not be determined arbitrarily, but should be contingent on critical factors including availability of the essential military capabilities. On 19 February 2009, the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations sent notes verbales to 60 Member States to ascertain if they would be willing to contribute troops, should the Security Council decide to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia. Only 10 Member States responded, all in the negative.

Assessment

56. The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation directly, at this stage, would be a high-risk option. In the prevailing security circumstances, deployment will require a substantial, robust military component that has full capacity to protect itself and to preserve a secure environment. Given the divergent views among the main Somali political players, as well as the attitude of groups that remain outside the Djibouti process, such an operation could trigger opposition from substantial elements of Somali society opposed to international military intervention. It is highly likely that those opposed to the peace process would portray the mission as a new enemy, which would consequently add momentum to the insurgency and detract from the political process. This could result in attacks against peacekeepers, and in efforts to draw the United Nations force into the conflict. Equally important, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation would undermine the efforts of the new Government to continue its national reconciliation efforts.

57. A peacekeeping operation in the present circumstances could therefore substantially change the dynamics of the conflict, not necessarily for the better. Before deciding on this risky option, which would also consume very substantial resources, it is advisable to assess the scope for alternative measures of United Nations engagement in Somalia. Such an approach would involve a lighter presence, and support the perception and reality of a peace process led by Somalis themselves.

Staying the current course: strengthening AMISOM while building Somalia's security institutions (option B)

58. In resolution 1863 (2009), the Security Council conceived of the United Nations support package for AMISOM and recognized the need for international assistance to build Somali security and rule of law institutions as precursors to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Those activities, coupled with the ongoing mediation efforts, and the humanitarian and recovery activities of the United Nations country team and other humanitarian organizations, in themselves represent a credible approach for achieving the United Nations strategic objectives. This is particularly the case in circumstances where, as noted above, the insertion of a United Nations force bears the risk of exacerbating divisions among the Somalis and offers hard-line insurgent groups an excuse for continuing or escalating the armed conflict. Continuing with the current strategy over the coming months, the United Nations would focus on the following activities:

Political track

59. In respect of the political track, UNPOS would continue to offer mediation and good offices to the Transitional Federal Government in support of its efforts to broaden the peace process. In order to facilitate this, UNPOS would need to conduct regular missions into Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, security conditions permitting. As in the case of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the United Nations country team would take the lead in providing support to institutional capacity-building and to local government, under the existing United Nations Transition Plan. Owing to the security environment, many of the related activities would be delivered through local partners to the extent possible, or through training and capacity-building activities in third countries. At the same time, the United Nations country team would seek opportunities to increase its recovery and peacebuilding activities, beginning with existing programmes in "Somaliland" and "Puntland".

60. With regard to human rights, UNPOS will expand its efforts in monitoring and providing capacity-building for the transitional federal institutions and civil society on human rights issues, including addressing impunity, and developing accountability, oversight and transitional justice mechanisms. Tasks that can be undertaken with limited access to Somalia include increased monitoring, for example, through engagement with refugees, substantive preparation of a conference on transitional justice, and capacity-building initiatives, including workshops on the harmonization of the relevant Somali law with international human rights and humanitarian law.

61. In parallel with human rights issues, the United Nations will support the Government and civil society organizations with technical expertise for the full inclusion of women's perspectives in the peace process as requested in resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, and facilitate consultations to allow for a common platform of women's network in the peace agenda.

Security track

62. On the security track, pending the build-up of Somali institutions to adequate levels, the United Nations would continue its support to AMISOM, helping

AMISOM to build its troop strength to the authorized level of 8,000 and strengthening the capacity of AMISOM to secure key infrastructure in Mogadishu. The objective should be to enable AMISOM to continue to secure strategic installations and provide a security backbone in the capital until the National Security Force is able to assume full responsibility for security in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the United Nations would help the Transitional Federal Government to develop an inclusive Somali security sector within a rule of law framework. UNPOS is already creating a transitional security sector cell covering security sector reform, support to the Joint Security Committee and to the formation of the National Security Force and support to the development of police training and planning capacity, in coordination with UNDP, complementing existing programmes. Based in Nairobi, the cell would undertake short visits to Somalia, support the new working groups established under the Joint Security Committee, and work in partnership with AMISOM, donors and the United Nations country team.

63. In parallel with the build-up of security institutions, the United Nations will continue to support the Transitional Federal Government with technical advice and support in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, police reactivation, justice and corrections development. Joint cooperation frameworks would be developed with the United Nations country team in this regard to ensure coherent and targeted international assistance, building on ongoing projects and activities.

64. While the lack of a United Nations presence in Mogadishu would be a constraint, creative partnerships have already evolved to deliver activities through a variety of mechanisms. For example, in the case of policing, UNDP has conducted training needs assessments, planning workshops and meetings along with Somali police leadership to help reactivate the Somali Police Force. UNDP has also facilitated and advised on issues of integrated and joint planning mechanisms to support not only the Somali Police Force but also the AMISOM police component. Basic training will also be delivered by the UNDP-trained Somali trainers at existing police academies in "Puntland" and in Mogadishu. Police officers in Mogadishu will receive training, advising and mentoring through the AMISOM Police component. The strategic coordination of these activities, liaison with donors and advice to the Somali police leadership will be provided jointly by the African Union and the United Nations. Technical advice and support on reactivation, training, restructuring and rebuilding will also be provided to AMISOM through the United Nations. UNDP (Somalia) has corrections and justice programmes on the ground and the funding to deliver improvement of infrastructure and to train prison and judicial officers. The prisons programme will focus initially on the Mogadishu and Baidoa area. The United Nations Mine Action Service would be able to provide support to the Somali police for the ongoing conduct of mine action and the development of national capabilities.

Recovery track

65. On the recovery track, programming under the United Nations Transition Plan is currently heavily concentrated in the more stable areas of "Somaliland" and "Puntland"; some activities have been undertaken in south central Somalia, including Mogadishu, and priority recovery programmes will be resumed when the situation permits and donors provide the requisite funding. On the basis of its recently updated security risk assessment, the United Nations country team is

currently finalizing new minimum operational security standards. These will detail risk mitigation measures geared towards a more resilient security posture, with the aim of sustaining an expanded United Nations presence and to facilitate delivery of priority programmes despite the current adverse security conditions. The United Nations Transition Plan is capable of expansion into south and central Somalia to deliver on key social services and livelihoods. A United Nations integrated strategic framework would be drafted by the joint planning unit of UNPOS and the United Nations country team to ensure coordination and coherence within an integrated strategic approach.

66. In respect of humanitarian delivery, existing programming will continue to use local and ad hoc mechanisms to reach populations in need. The role of AMISOM in humanitarian assistance should be limited to the creation of security conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance pursuant to Security Council resolution 1772 (2007). While preserving humanitarian space, it is hoped that the ongoing efforts of the Government to promote reconciliation will also gradually deliver improvements in access to populations in need and in security.

Assessment

67. This option, which represents a continuation of the strategy outlined in resolution 1863 (2009) and further developed through the recent technical assessment mission, represents a pragmatic approach. It demonstrates how, even under the current security conditions, the United Nations system can continue to engage in all the thematic areas that could, when possible, form part of a larger peacekeeping effort, on the basis of an integrated strategic approach and in partnership with the African Union, donors and Somalis. However, this approach has some significant limitations. Without an anchored presence on the ground, especially in Mogadishu, and with only limited visits, it relies heavily on engagement with Somalis from outside the country, potentially limiting support of the peace process that has relocated to Somalia itself. Issues of monitoring, accountability and oversight are also of concern, especially with respect to transitional security institutions. Overall, this is a valid option, but one which would require constant attention to ensure transparency and trust between Somali and international actors.

Staying the current course with a "light footprint" in Somalia (option C)

68. A third approach would seek to expand option B through the establishment of a "light footprint" in Mogadishu. This would involve the relocation of elements of UNPOS and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, as well as the United Nations country team. This approach would require further improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu, enhanced cooperation and support from AMISOM and a package of robust security measures as outlined above.

69. Under this option, all the activities listed under option B would continue, but supplemented by a small continuous and incremental presence of UNPOS and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM staff in Mogadishu. Depending on security conditions, the initial goal would be to relocate a limited number of key UNPOS/United Nations Support Office for AMISOM staff, whose main tasks would be to liaise regularly with AMISOM and Somali partners, including the Government

and the Joint Security Committee, in support of the strategy deriving from resolution 1863 (2009); to act as an information resource to permit a better understanding of the needs on the ground; and to facilitate more effective delivery and oversight of political and security assistance provided through the United Nations in addition to tasks covered under option B.

70. The "light footprint" approach could commence with operations in the AMISOM-controlled area, and may be expanded or reduced depending on the evolving security situation on the ground. For the establishment of a United Nations presence in Mogadishu, it would be necessary to make a substantial investment in the security infrastructure, including the construction of secure offices and accommodation on site, achieving reliable medical support and the deployment of high-standard armoured vehicles and other equipment. As long as Mogadishu remains in security phase V, United Nations international staff can be deployed only on mission status and would have to rotate in and out according to priority activities and specific requirements for delivery on the ground in their respective areas. Under existing United Nations security policies, a permanent regular assignment of United Nations international staff to Mogadishu would require the downgrading of the security phase from V to IV.

71. It is envisaged that the initial UNPOS/United Nations Support Office for AMISOM presence would be located separately from the existing United Nations agencies' facilities and remain structurally distinct from the activities of the humanitarian community and the United Nations country team. Humanitarian and recovery activity would therefore proceed along the same lines as in previous options, while coordination between UNPOS/United Nations Support Office for AMISOM and the United Nations country team would be anchored by the drafting of a United Nations integrated strategic framework through the joint planning unit as under option B.

72. The establishment of a "light footprint" would be implemented gradually, beginning with more regular visits by United Nations staff to Mogadishu. This would be followed by the development of a security concept for a small semi-permanent presence. At this stage, the most credible approach is likely to involve establishing a small UNPOS/United Nations Support Office for AMISOM within the envisaged AMISOM headquarters that would encompass both living and working accommodation for the United Nations unit. In the initial phase, security arrangements for the United Nations presence would rely heavily on AMISOM infrastructure, requiring implementation of the measures already envisaged in the United Nations logistics package.

Assessment

73. This is a prudent option, which strikes a balance between security concerns and the need for closer engagement with Somali actors in Mogadishu, allowing more effective planning, delivery and oversight of the strategy outlined in resolution 1863 (2009). It has the flexibility for expansion or reduction as conditions on the ground permit. A carefully calibrated and progressive implementation of this approach could eventually result in a structure reflecting many of the same capacities as those that would be present in a United Nations peacekeeping operation, but in a looser and more flexible configuration that avoids provoking negative reactions from spoilers.

74. This option represents a complex coordination challenge, but has the capacity to bring its own advantages of flexibility and core presence, including cost effectiveness and empowerment of the Somali actors. One drawback which should be recognized is that identifying United Nations substantive activities more closely with AMISOM, in particular co-location, could result in additional risks to United Nations personnel from insurgents opposed to the presence of AMISOM. A phased approach, allowing for full assessment of the risks and developing trust with local actors would therefore be critical, with particular attention to preserving the impartiality of humanitarian actors.

Engagement with no international security presence (option D)

75. Finally, given the risk of a possible degeneration of the fragile security situation, and divisions among Somali actors regarding the presence of AMISOM, the integrated mission planning process identified the need to plan for a scenario in which there may be no international security presence in Mogadishu. This could occur in a variety of circumstances, ranging from a decision of the African Union to withdraw AMISOM or a request from the Government for the African Union to wind AMISOM down, to a "worst-case scenario" whereby AMISOM would be forced to withdraw in the context of a serious deterioration in security.

76. In a scenario where AMISOM withdraws in the context of the ongoing peace process, the United Nations should continue to engage on the basis of the strategic objectives laid out above. In a best-case scenario, depending on the security situation and the state of development of the Somali security apparatus, UNPOS and the United Nations country team might be able to establish a presence in-country under arrangements agreed directly with the Government of Somalia. Priority areas of engagement would remain those laid out in previous options, including support to transition tasks and the development of governance and the rule of law.

77. However, it is more likely that the withdrawal of AMISOM would leave a security vacuum that would seriously challenge the delivery of certain United Nations programmes and objectives. This would certainly be true in a worst-case scenario where the departure of AMISOM was accompanied by increased violence. A United Nations presence in-country would then become untenable, necessitating a re-evaluation of programmes particularly in the area of support to Somali security institutions. Humanitarian operations would continue to be remote-controlled from Nairobi, but with challenges to access and limited capacity to monitor impact.

78. In a worst-case scenario, the approach of the United Nations should focus on containing the conflict; protecting essential humanitarian and human rights activity; and creating space to restore the peace process. The United Nations should (a) provide advice and logistic support to AMISOM evacuation if necessary; (b) formalize arrangements for a naval escort to protect World Food Programme vessels and other critical shipping; (c) review options for a multinational force and/or maritime task force to prevent escalation of the conflict and/or facilitate restoration of the peace process; (d) maintain human rights monitoring; and (e) explore options to improve the effectiveness of anti-piracy operations and reinforce the arms embargo.

79. Given this set of tasks, the option of a maritime task force set out in my letter dated 19 December 2008 remains relevant for a worst-case scenario. A United

Nations or multinational maritime task force could potentially be a valuable approach to support evacuation or emergency assistance to AMISOM and any United Nations elements located in Mogadishu; protect humanitarian assistance; and host a small landing force, capable of securing small locations on a temporary basis in support of the peace process.

Assessment

80. This option represents a response to difficult circumstances and not a preferred state of affairs. In this setting, the strategy set out in resolution 1863 (2009) would be rendered moot and further guidance would be sought from the Security Council. However, the outline above provides an indication of the scope for continued engagement, including supporting or restoring the peace process and ensuring that emergency needs continue to be met through an integrated approach on the part of the United Nations.

V. Observations

81. The present political progress and opportunities for peace in Somalia are real and have been hard won. They deserve the international community's thoughtful, generous and sustained support. As the Security Council considers its responsibilities and the United Nations scope for action, it is essential to explore all options and make a sober judgement about the best way to help the people of Somalia, who have lived under the scourge of war for some 20 years to build peace. It is also important to bear in mind lessons from previous United Nations peacekeeping experiences in Somalia and ensure that the Organization decides on the appropriate engagement this time.

82. In this regard, it is my assessment that, while the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation should remain the United Nations goal, realistically achieving that goal will require fulfilling the conditions set out earlier in this and my previous reports. For the present, I therefore recommend an incremental approach, whereby the United Nations would pursue its strategic objectives as set out in paragraphs 42 and 43 above, while continuing to work towards the deployment of a peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time.

83. The proposed approach would be taken in three phases: in the first phase, the United Nations would maintain its current engagement approved in Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), as set out in option B. This consists of support to AMISOM, support in building the Somali security institutions, and support for the political process and the recovery and humanitarian activities of the United Nations country team. During this phase, the relevant United Nations components would conduct frequent missions to Mogadishu and other accessible areas of Somalia to monitor implementation of the mandated activities. Progress in the implementation of this first phase would be assessed after three to four months.

84. If security conditions permit, the United Nations engagement would then be extended to the second phase, encompassing the activities set out in option C above. This would entail adding to the activities of the first phase a light United Nations footprint in Mogadishu consisting of elements from UNPOS, to support the political process on the ground; the Department of Field Support, to oversee delivery of the

AMISOM support package; and the United Nations country team, to oversee delivery of humanitarian assistance, and recovery and development projects.

85. These two phases would be considered as transitional steps, which allow time to fully implement the planned support package to AMISOM, assess the progress of the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to build security and develop its own security institutions, and gauge the acceptability of a United Nations presence in Mogadishu. Like the first phase, the second phase would also be assessed three to four months after the commencement of its implementation, at which time the Security Council would review the United Nations role and decide whether the conditions and timing are conducive to a shift to the final phase, in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation could be established to take over from AMISOM, as set out in option A.

86. In addition, throughout the three phases, it will be important to have in place a contingency plan for continuing United Nations engagement under the scenarios described in option D, where there could be a possible degeneration of the security situation that would make it untenable to establish and retain an international presence in Mogadishu.

87. This is a prudent, carefully calibrated and flexible approach which enables the United Nations to gauge the acceptability, sustainability and effectiveness of the progressive establishment of an expanding United Nations presence and place emphasis on building the capacity of Somalia's security institutions and support to AMISOM. It also allows the United Nations to pursue all options (A, B and C) at the appropriate time, circumstances and conditions permitting. The first two phases will allow the United Nations the flexibility to expand or reduce its engagement as needs and conditions on the ground demand.

88. The success of this approach, however, hinges on continuing United Nations support for AMISOM, investment by Member States in supporting the effective development of Somalia's security institutions and the necessary security infrastructure to establish the envisaged United Nations presence. More importantly, it would also depend on the continuing cooperation of the Government of Somalia and its full and inclusive engagement in the peace process. Building a Somali National Security Force and a police force that are capable of taking over responsibility for security in the country is the central aspect of this strategy. The recommended approach thus places emphasis on Somali ownership and capacity-building. At the same time, it acknowledges that the peace process is at a fluid stage and that all options must remain on the table.

89. The effective and multifaceted reconciliation efforts initiated by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Transitional Federal Government, while attracting concrete support from the Somali population, have also brought about counter- and negative actions, including increased attacks and attempts at political destabilization. Those negative actions were, to some degree, anticipated and it is unlikely that there will be a fully inclusive process in the short term. Inevitably, some minority groups will continue to pursue a hard-line stance and refuse any offers of peaceful reconciliation. It is important that these groups are not allowed to prevent further progress from being made.

90. For the Transitional Federal Government to be able to sustain its reconciliation efforts and extend its authority on the ground, it needs support from the

international community that allows it to carry forward its ongoing political negotiations and reconciliation efforts from a position of strength. It needs to be able to show to the Somali population the benefits of supporting the process, including the creation of livelihoods for the population, the provision of basic services, the establishment of a more effective and increasing revenue stream, and the rebuilding of its institutions and infrastructure.

91. The efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to achieve these goals must be underpinned by the development of an effective and progressive security sector firmly committed to the rule of law. At the same time, United Nations and bilateral support to AMISOM should be maintained in a substantive and predictable manner to allow time and space to build Somalia's security sector, and for the Transitional Federal Government to effectively establish its authority.

92. I applaud and pay tribute to the dedication and courage of AMISOM troops who are playing a vital role on the ground in very difficult conditions. It is essential to support them in discharging their functions, through full deployment of the United Nations package, the United Nations Trust Fund and bilateral assistance. Assistance is also required to support the Government in developing its own security forces and civilian police within a rule of law framework. I urge Member States to recall that support to these activities is a critical element of the strategy set out in resolution 1863 (2009), and encourage them to contribute generously at the donors' conference scheduled for 23 April in Brussels.

93. In the meantime, I remain deeply concerned at the worsening humanitarian situation in Somalia, and at the underfunding of life-saving humanitarian assistance. The safe provision of humanitarian aid is and will remain a priority alongside efforts aimed at peace, security and institutional reform. I urge Member States to come forward with additional pledges to the consolidated appeal for Somalia that will enable the United Nations and its partners to deliver much-needed assistance to populations trapped in a deadly constellation of conflict, drought and economic crisis. I also urge Member States to fund priority recovery programmes in the United Nations Transition Plan to ensure that the Somali population at large reaps the benefits of peace.

94. Finally, I would like to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, who continues to work tirelessly to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation among the people of Somalia. I commend the efforts of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which, despite the volatile security situation and the targeted killing and kidnapping of their staff, continue the struggle to provide shelter, water, food and medical assistance to hundreds of thousands in need. I pay tribute to all personnel, both international and national staff, for the important work they continue to carry out in Somalia in the interests of peace. I call on the Somali people and Member States to continue rendering my Special Representative their unwavering support and cooperation.